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Abstract
Many mechanisms (such as auctions) eﬃciently allocate a good to
the ﬁrm which most highly values it. But sometimes the owner of the
asset or good may wish to transfer it only if it is not too valuable to
potential buyers. The allocation problem becomes especially diﬃcult
when the potential buyers have private information about the asset’s
value. We describe several mechanisms which are eﬃcient, or nearly
so. We also show that rent seeking, and lobbying, rather than merely
wasting resources, can lead to allocations which are close to eﬃcient.
Keywords: Rent seeking; Lobbying; Auctions; Asymmetric infor-
mation
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11 Introduction
A standard economic problem is to allocate a good to the person or ﬁrm
which most highly values it, where the seller does not know the buyers’
valuations. In many examples of this sort of problem, simple auctions are
mechanisms which allocate the good eﬃciently. But sometimes the allocator
(say government) may prefer to keep the good if (and only if) it is valued
highly by potential recipients.
For example, suppose government speciﬁes an amount it will pay for a
given quantity of a good from a private ﬁrm. If intense lobbying by ﬁrms
suggests that the ﬁrms would earn obscene proﬁts, government may choose
to scuttle the deal.
Similarly, suppose government owns a facility that produces a good or
service it needs. A private ﬁrm can operate the facility more eﬃciently than
can government, but government is unsure about the monopoly power that
would be exercised by a private owner (for example, the government may
be unsure about the ease of entry into the industry). Government would
therefore be more willing to sell the facility the less the ﬁrms value owning
it.
As our last example, suppose the marginal cost of public funds exceeds 1,
and that the government owns some income–producing asset. Government
may prefer to retain the asset, and so retain the income stream generated,
even if private ﬁrms could operate the asset more eﬃciently. Suppose as well
that the private sector’s cost advantage is unrelated to the value of the asset.
Then the government may retain the asset if its value is high, but let the
private sector operate it if its value is low.
The general idea here thus relates to the market for lemons—the more
eager is a party to sell, the more cautious is the buyer. We turn this around,
by supposing that the more eager are ﬁrms to obtain some prize or asset, the
less willing should government be to give it.
2 Literature
We look at mechanisms which reveal private information. Other literature
looks at the related issue of information provided by interest groups. The
information can concern the importance of the problem a legislator is con-
sidering (Hansen (1991), Smith (1995)), the eﬀectiveness of policy (Krehbiel
2(1991), Smith (1984 and 1995), Lohmann (1995), Wright (1996)), and the
electoral consequences of diﬀerent policies (Kingdon (1984), Hansen (1991),
Rasmusen (1993), Lohmann (1995 and 1998)).
Austen-Smith (1995) models how contributions signal policy preferences.
In Lohmann (1995) interest groups pay a contribution to gain access and
provide information to the policymaker. Glazer and Konrad (1995) consider
a ﬁrm which lobbies for a tariﬀ partly to signal to other ﬁrms that it has low
costs, and thus to deter entry.
Konrad (2003) elegantly solves a problem related to ours. He considers
an agent who wants to award the prize to the contestant who most highly
values it, with each contestant knowing the value of the prize to itself and
to other contestants, but with the awarding agent not knowing this. Konrad
shows that a sequence of all-pay contests, with the prize awarded to the
contestant who won m more contests than the others, will perfectly reveal
which contestant most highly values the prize, while aggregate spending by
the contestants approaches zero. This mechanism, however, leaves the prize-
giver uninformed about the value of the prize (he only knows who values it
most highly) and so does not apply to our problem.
The informational beneﬁts of rent seeking are examined by Lagerlof (2005),
who considers a lobby that has truth on its side and that can engage in a
costly activity to prove it. Tirole and Dewatripont (1999) provide an infor-
mational rationale for advocacy, showing how competition among opposing
parties can promote information revelation.
The informational problem we consider resembles that studied by Baron
and Myerson (1982) on the regulation of a monopolist with unknown cost.
We follow them in one of our mechanisms, with government oﬀering a menu
of contracts.
3 Assumptions
Each ﬁrm knows the common value of a prize. The value is either high (VH)
or low (VL), with VH > VL. The principal, the “government,” oﬀers the prize
to the ﬁrms; initially the government is ignorant about the prize’s value, but
may learn about it from the behavior of the ﬁrms. Government assesses a
prior probability, π, that the value is high. If the asset’s value to any ﬁrm is
VH, government values retaining it at GH; government values retaining the
3asset at GL if its value to any ﬁrm is VL, with GH > VH > VL > GL.1We
shall at ﬁrst consider perfectly revealing mechanisms, mostly supposing that
government aims to award the prize if it knows its value is VL, but not if
its value is VH. Since these mechanisms are not used in practice, one of
our tasks is to show the time-inconsistency problems inherent in perfectly
revealing mechanisms. We shall also use these mechanisms as a benchmark
for the performance of mechanisms we do see used, such as rent seeking and
lobbying.
4 Eﬃcient mechanisms
A mechanism is eﬃcient if it reveals the private information of ﬁrms, while
having government award the prize only when its value to a ﬁrm exceeds its
value to government. We show that no mechanism with government using a
pure strategy can induce the ﬁrm to reveal its private information. But when
government is less constrained, we show that mechanisms can induce a ﬁrm
to reveal its private information, with an inﬁnitesimally small probability
that government must award the prize when it should not.
4.1 Single ﬁrm
4.1.1 Pure strategies
Consider ﬁrst a single ﬁrm, which knows whether the value of the prize is
high or low. Consider equilibria with truthful revelation (which we know
from Myerson’s Revelation Principal is optimal). Let a type-L ﬁrm (a ﬁrm
which knows the prize has value VL) which announces it is of type-L be paid
KL, and win the prize with probability πL. A type-H ﬁrm which announces
it is of type-H is paid KH, and wins the prize with probability πH. The
incentive compatibility constraint is that a type-H ﬁrm is indiﬀerent about
revealing its type, or that KL + πLVH = KH + πHVH. The participation
constraint is that KL + πLVL ≥ 0.
With one ﬁrm, and a government which cannot commit, no mechanism
can induce truthful revelation. For suppose a ﬁrm reports that the value of
1In the example about the “marginal cost of public funds” mentioned in the Intro-
duction, suppose that 1 + m is the marginal cost of public funds, and that C is the cost
advantage of the private sector. Then GH = (1+m)(VH −C), and GL = (1+m)(VL−C),
so that if mVH(1 + m) > CmVL the inequalities GH > VH > VL > GL hold.
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of the prize is indeed high, and if KH > VH −wL the ﬁrm prefers doing so to
reporting that the value of the prize is low. And if the value of the prize is
low, and if VL − KL > KH, the ﬁrm prefers reporting low. Combining these
inequalities gives VL − KL > wH > VH − KL. But since VL < VH, this is
impossible.
Thus, since a ﬁrm which truthfully announced that the value is high
would get nothing, no equilibrium can exist in pure strategies.
4.1.2 Nearly optimal mechanism
Though a perfectly revealing mechanism does not exist, a mechanism can be
designed which induces truthful revelation with probability approaching 1.
Let a ﬁrm announce whether proﬁts from the prize will be high (VH) or
low (VL). If the ﬁrm announces VL, it gets the asset; at the time it gets the
asset, the ﬁrm knows whether its value will be VH or VL. The mechanism
design has the consequences of announcing VH come in three parts. First,
the ﬁrm pays the government K. Second, government transfers the asset to
the ﬁrm. Third, after government realizes the value of the asset, it makes
a transfer (or imposes a tax) so that with probability 1/t the ﬁrm earns a
proﬁt of (t + λ)V (with V = VH or V = VL, whichever will be realized).
A ﬁrm which knows the value of the prize is VL will be indiﬀerent between
the two choices if (1/t)(t+λ)VL−K = VL, or if λ = Kt/VL. If this condition
holds, then a ﬁrm which knows the prize is worth VH will strictly prefer the
lottery.
In short, when λ = Kt/VL an equilibrium has the ﬁrm truthfully reveal its
private information. Government always awards the prize when its value is
low. Government awards the prize when its value is high with probability 1/t,
which can be made inﬁnitesimally small. The payment government makes,
on average (1/t)λVH, is a transfer payment, not aﬀecting social welfare.
The mechanism suﬀers from two weaknesses. First, it violates incentive
compatibility for government—it would never want to award the prize when
its value is high. Second, it requires government to condition the transfer on
the realized value of V ; commitment to such a transfer can be diﬃcult if V is
not veriﬁable. Absent these considerations, however, the mechanism can be
made to deviate from the eﬃcient solution by an arbitrarily small amount.
54.2 Two ﬁrms
Government can do better if it faces not one ﬁrm, but two ﬁrms with common
knowledge of the value of the prize, and which compete to obtain it. In
particular, government can set payments which do not depend on the realized
values of the prize.
Consider simple mechanisms, in which each ﬁrm announces a value for
the prize, either VH or VL. We describe below mechanisms which make
truth–telling a Nash equilibrium for the ﬁrms.
Suppose the government adopts the following policy. If both ﬁrms an-
nounce VL it will award the prize to either ﬁrm, with probability 1/2. If either
ﬁrm announces VH, government will keep the prize. Then truth–telling is a
Nash equilibrium. If the true value is VH, and one ﬁrm announces VH, then
the other ﬁrm gains nothing by lying.
This simple mechanism, however, suﬀers from several obvious defects.
First, announcing VH is a weakly dominated strategy for each ﬁrm, yet both
ﬁrms are supposed to choose it when the true value is VH. Second, the
government’s policy may be time inconsistent: the government will want to
keep the prize when the announced values are (VL,VH) or (VH,VL) only if it
believes it fairly likely that the prize has a high value when these announce-
ments are made, or that the probability the value of the prize is high is ¯ π or
greater, where
¯ π(GH − VH) = (1 − ¯ π)(VL − GL). (1)
So the government’s commitment to enforce its own rules depends on its own
out–of–equilibrium conjectures. Third, under this mechanism the revealing
Nash equilibrium is not the only Nash equilibrium: both ﬁrms always an-
nouncing VH is another Nash equilibrium, again involving weakly dominated
strategies. Both ﬁrms always announcing VL is also a Nash equilibrium. The
government will want to obey its own rules with these pooling equilibria if
π ≥ ¯ π in the ﬁrst case, and if π ≤ ¯ π in the second.
Not all the defects of the mechanism just presented can be avoided. That
is, if the mechanism were to induce truth–telling as the unique Nash equilib-
rium for the bidders, then the government would want to renege some of the
time on its own mechanism, once it learned the truth.
Proposition 1 If some direct mechanism induces truth–telling as a Nash
equilibrium, and if government keeps the prize whenever it believes that with
6probability ¯ π or higher the prize has high value, then a Nash equilibrium exists
in which each ﬁrm always announces that the prize has high value.
Proof: Let the parameters of the mechanism be γij and Kij, with γij the
probability that ﬁrm 1 gets the prize when the announcements are i and j,
and with Kij the payment made to ﬁrm 1 in this situation.
The time consistency requirement (government retains the prize when it
believes it likely has high value) means that if truthful revelation is to be a
Nash equilibrium, then γHH = 0.
If truthful revelation is a Nash equilibrium, then ﬁrm 1 must not gain
from announcing L, if the true value is high, and if ﬁrm 2 announces H.
Therefore, it must be that
(γLH − γHH)VH ≤ KHH − KLH. (2)
Since time consistency requires that γHH = 0, it follows that therefore
γLH ≥ γHH, which implies that
(γLH − γHH)VL ≤ KHH − KLH. (3)
Analogous conditions hold for ﬁrm 2, so that equations (2) and (3) imply
that “always announce H” must also be a Nash equilibrium for the mecha-
nism. QED.
The government, however, can get arbitrarily close to a mechanism in
which the dominant strategies for the bidders are to tell the truth, and
in which the government is willing to honor its own rules. The following
mechanism requires the government to award the prize with some positive
probability even when it has learned that its value is high. The probability,
however, can be made arbitrarily small.
The rules of the mechanism are :
• If both ﬁrms announce low, then government awards the prize to each
of them with probability 1/2. The ﬁrm which wins the prize pays VL−.
• If both ﬁrms announce high, then each ﬁrm wins the prize with prob-
ability . The ﬁrm winning the prize pays VL + .
• If one ﬁrm announces high and the other low then the ﬁrm which
announced low does not get a chance at the prize. But the ﬁrm which
announced high gets the prize with probability 1/2+, and pays VL+
if it wins the prize.
7With the above rules, a ﬁrm’s dominant strategy is to tell the truth. Each
ﬁrm gets a non–negative net payoﬀ in equilibrium, whether the true value is
high or low, so each is willing to participate. In equilibrium, ﬁrms will never
give diﬀerent answers. So the government’s rules oblige it to award the prize
for sure if its value is low, and to award it with probability 2 if its value is
high. Since  can be made arbitrarily small, the government is required to
behave contrary to its own interest with arbitrarily small probability.
Proposition 1 above holds as well if there are more than 2 bidders. And
the mechanism can be generalized to more than 2 bidders: with n > 2 ﬁrms,
each ﬁrm wins the prize with probability 1/n if all n ﬁrms announce a low
value, and each ﬁrm announcing a high value wins the prize with probability
1/n +  if m ﬁrms announce a high value, with m < n.
5 Rent-seeking
The mechanisms described above are not commonly seen, and therefore ap-
pear to contribute little to a positive analysis of government behavior. Per-
haps they are not used because other mechanisms can do as well, or almost
as well. We accordingly examine a model of rent seeking, which is widely
studied in the literature, and appears to give the spirit of how special inter-
est politics works. In the standard rent-seeking model, if ﬁrm i spends xi
on rent seeking, it wins the prize with probability xi/(
P
j xj). We modify
the standard rent-seeking game, in one way: if the government believes that
the value of the prize is high, it awards it to some ﬁrm only with probability
z < 1.2
5.1 Two ﬁrms
As before, let each of the two ﬁrms value the prize at either VH or VL.
When the prize is VL, the equilibrium is for each ﬁrm to spend VL/4, and a
ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts are VL/4. When the prize of value VH is awarded with
probability z, the standard rent-seeking has each ﬁrm spend zVH/4, and earn
expected proﬁts of zVH/4.
Consider the state of nature where the ﬁrms value the prize at VH. If each
ﬁrm spent VL/4 on lobbying, the government would learn nothing about the
2For the seminal papers on rent seeking, see Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), Posner
(1975), and Bhagwati (1982).
8value of the prize, and, by assumption, would award the prize. A ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁts would be VH/2 − VL/4. But this is not the equilibrium.
For suppose one ﬁrm spent x > VL/4. Government would then know that
the prize is worth VH, and by assumption would award the prize only with
probability z < 1. We suppose that which ﬁrm gets the prize follows the stan-
dard rent-seeking model. A ﬁrm spending x wins the prize with probability
z x














zVHVL > VL this exceeds VL/4. Substituting this x into the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
function yields
Π = zVH −
q
zVHVL + VL/4. (6)
This can exceed VH/2 − VL/4, the proﬁts were the ﬁrm to spend VL/4.
For suﬃciently large VH, a ﬁrm will prefer to spend x > VL/4 if z > 1/2.
Thus if the government can be trusted not to renege, rent-seeking among two
ﬁrms can reveal information, but at a high cost of eﬃciency.
5.2 More than 2 ﬁrms
The previous section considered two ﬁrms which rent seek. Here we extend
the model to consider n > 2 ﬁrms. We are particularly interested in behavior
when n is large. Extending the analysis given above, with n ﬁrms, and a prize
of value VL, in equilibrium each ﬁrm spends VL
n
(n−1)2. Each ﬁrm’s expected
proﬁts are VL/n2.
Now suppose one ﬁrm spent x > VL
n
(n−1)2. Government would then know
that the prize is worth VH, and by assumption would award the prize only
with probability z < 1. We suppose that which ﬁrm gets the prize follows
the standard rent-seeking model. The ﬁrm that spends x wins the prize with
probability z x
x+(n−1)nVL/(n−1)2. Its expected proﬁts are
zVH
x




9The ﬁrst-order condition is that
x =
q
VHVLz(n − 1)/n − VL(n − 1)
2/n
2. (8)
Substituting this x into the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function yields
Π = 2(1 − n)
q
VHVLz/n + VHz + VL(n − 1)
2/n
2. (9)
If, instead, the ﬁrm spent VL
n




(n − 1)2. (10)
For large n, the diﬀerence between these two approaches
−2
q
VHVLz + VHz + VL. (11)
This is positive if V 2
Hz2 − 2VHVLz > −V 2
L, which for any given z will hold
for suﬃciently small VL and suﬃciently large VH. Under these conditions,
rent seeking is eﬃcient. That is, when many ﬁrms rent seek, the private
information held by ﬁrms is perfectly revealed, government will alway award
the prize when it should (that is, when its value is VL), and government will
rarely award the prize when it shouldn’t (that is, when its value is VH).
6 Lobbying
As our last mechanism, which is also observed in practice, we consider lob-
bying. We take lobbying as similar to rent seeking, but with the diﬀerence
that lobbying is a binary choice (a ﬁrm either lobbies or not), and that the
cost of lobbying is ﬁxed at F. We also consider here only subgame-perfect
solutions, with government awarding the prize only if it is in its own interest
to do so
Thus, each ﬁrm, knowing the value of the prize, must decide whether
to lobby. After observing lobbying by the ﬁrms, the government decides
whether to award the prize. The lobbying enables the government to update
its estimate of the probability that the asset has value VH, to some posterior
belief ˜ π. It will award the prize if and only if ˜ π ≤ ¯ π, where the threshold
probability ¯ π was deﬁned above by equation (1). If government does award
the prize, it does not care which ﬁrm gets the prize, since the value is common.
Hence the government can commit credibly to the following rule:
10If the government awards the prize after only one ﬁrm lobbied,
then the ﬁrm which lobbied wins the prize.
Firms know the government’s prior belief, π, and its valuations GH and GL
of the prize in the two diﬀerent states of nature. Therefore, they know that
government will award the prize only when it beneﬁts from doing so.
If the government awards the prize after neither ﬁrm had lobbied, then
each wins it with probability 1/2.
Lobbying here involves no transfer to the government, with F representing
a real social cost. A ﬁrm which lobbies incurs this cost F whether or not it
gets the prize. The ﬁrms make their lobbying decisions simultaneously, each
aiming to maximize its expected proﬁts. (Proﬁts are the value of the prize,
times the probability of winning the prize, minus any lobbying costs the ﬁrm
incurred.)
6.1 Firms’ behavior
Suppose ﬁrms anticipate that the government will retain the prize if they
both lobby, but that it will award the prize if one ﬁrm lobbies, or if nei-
ther ﬁrm does. We will examine below whether this behavior is rational for
the government; we ﬁrst consider a ﬁrms’ lobbying activity, given that each
anticipates this behavior by the government.
It is not obvious that more ﬁrms will lobby when the prize has high value.
For a ﬁrm which lobbies improves its chance of winning the prize if the other
ﬁrm did not lobby, but will lose the prize if the other ﬁrm did lobby. We
consider the possibility of each ﬁrm adopting the identical mixed strategy,
choosing to lobby with probability λi (i = H or L) when the value of the
prize is Vi.
These mixed strategies can maximize a ﬁrm’s proﬁts only if a ﬁrm is
indiﬀerent about lobbying. If ﬁrm 1 does not lobby, it wins the prize only
if neither did ﬁrm 2 lobby: government chooses ﬁrm 1 with probability 1/2.
The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt is (1−λi)Vi/2, where Vi is the value of the prize in
state i (i ∈ {L,H}). If ﬁrm 1 does lobby then it wins the prize if ﬁrm 2 did
not lobby. (Recall that we are looking at a possible equilibrium in which the
government awards no prize if both ﬁrms lobby). The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt
is (1 − λi)Vi − F. So the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between lobbying and not, or a
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies can exist, if (1−λi)Vi/2 = (1−λi)Vi−F,
11or if
λi = 1 − 2F/Vi, (12)
which can hold when 0 < F < Vi/2. Thus, a necessary condition for the
existence of a Nash equilibrium of this type is that




Equation (12) implies that λi increases with Vi: the ﬁrms will more likely
lobby when the value of the prize is high than when it is low. Thus, the
number of ﬁrms that lobbied signals the value of the prize to the ﬁrms. It
can be rational for the government to deny the prize if both ﬁrms lobbied.
The expected joint proﬁts of the ﬁrms if they play their equilibrium strate-
gies, and if the government awards the prize unless they both lobby, is
−2λiF + Vi(1 − λ
2
i). (14)
Substituting for λi gives expected proﬁts as 2F.
Notice that if the ﬁxed costs of lobbying are very low, then both λL and λH
approach 1: lobbying activity would convey little information. Nonetheless,
the government may learn enough from observing lobbying behavior, even
when F is very small, to beneﬁt from the proposed strategy of awarding the
prize only if at least one ﬁrm refrained from lobbying.
6.2 Government’s estimate of the value of the prize
We now consider the government’s optimal actions, given the behavior of the
ﬁrms. Our ﬁrst task is to determine the expected payoﬀ to the government
when it awards the prize only if the probability that its value to a ﬁrm is
VH lies below some ¯ π. Government uses the (common) prior belief π and
its observation of the number of ﬁrms that lobbied to generate a posterior
estimate of the probability that the value of the prize is high. Suppose then
that with probability λi either ﬁrm lobbies when it values the prize at Vi.
Then the posterior probability that the prize has high value when n ﬁrms











πλH(1 − λH) + (1 − π)λL(1 − λL)
. (16)
12If the ﬁrms use their equilibrium mixed strategies, equation (12) implies
(15) and (16) can be written as
π2 =
π(VH − 2F)2V 2
H
π(VH − 2F)2V 2







πL2(VH − 2F) + (1 − π)V 2
H(VL − 2F)
. (18)
Equations (17) and (18) imply that both π1 and π2 increase with F.
At the maximum value of F consistent with condition (13), π1 = π2 = 1.
For lower values of F, π2 always exceeds π1. When F = 0, π2 = π and
π1 = (πVL)/(πVL + [1 − π]VH). Figure 1 depicts π1 and π2 as functions of F
when VH = 2, VL = 1, and π = 1/2.
The previous section assumed that each ﬁrm expects government to award
the prize unless they both lobbied. The government will choose this strategy
if and only if
π2 > ¯ π > π1. (19)
The inequality π0 ≤ π1 always holds. Therefore, precisely when condition
(19) holds will an equilibrium exist in which the government awards the prize
unless both ﬁrms lobby.
6.3 Existence of an equilibrium
The previous two sub–sections give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which lobbying signals the value of
the prize, and in which the government retains the prize if (and only if) both
ﬁrms lobby.
Given the government’s posited behavior, ﬁrms will lobby with probabil-
ity λi when the prize has value i, with 0 < λL < λH < 1, only if condition
(13) holds. The government will be willing to obey the rule “award the prize
if and only if fewer than two ﬁrms lobby” if and only if π1 < ¯ π < π2, where
π2 and π1 are deﬁned by equations (17) and (18).
If the lobbying cost F is small, so that both λL and λH approach 1, then
π2 → π, and π1 → πVL/(πVL + (1 − π)VH).
At F = 0, the requirement that ¯ π < π2 is simply that ¯ π < π: the
government would retain the asset (or not award the prize) based on prior
13information. Not surprisingly, if the lobbying cost F is very low, a govern-
ment which sees both ﬁrms lobby will change little from its prior beliefs. The
requirement that ¯ π > π1 at F = 0 must also hold, so that for low values of









Moreover, whenever the left inequality in (20) holds, then for some range
of F this equilibrium will exist.
In our example discussing the “marginal cost of public funds,” the con-
dition ¯ π < π is simply that m[EV ] > (1+m)C, or that the value of keeping
expected rents from the prize in the public sector exceeds the cost disadvan-
tage. The condition ¯ π > (πL)/(πL + [1 − π]VH), necessary for ¯ π to exceed
π1, becomes
mVHVL < (1 + m)C[πVL + (1 − π)VH]. (21)
When VL = VH = EV , condition (21) becomes m[EV ] < (1 + m)C which
cannot be consistent with ¯ π < π. But whenever VH > VL, for some range
of values of C and m inequality (21) holds, and ¯ π is still less than π. For
example, if VL/VH is suﬃciently small, then condition (21) must hold.
The threshold probability ¯ π does not depend on the ﬁxed costs F: it is
determined by the relation among VL, VH, GL, and GH. So the signaling
equilibrium proposed here will exist whenever this threshold ¯ π lies between
the two curves in Figure 1.
In general, then, if under government’s prior beliefs it would retain the
asset, if the variation in the asset’s possible value is large, and if lobbying
costs are small, then lobbying is informative. In such circumstances, seeing
exactly one ﬁrm lobby signals that the prize likely has a low value. This
enables the government to transfer the asset to the private sector precisely
when the government would most beneﬁt from the transfer.
The informational beneﬁts we discuss would disappear if ﬁrms colluded.
Since the equilibrium we described had government retain the prize if both
ﬁrms lobbied, the ﬁrms may agree that in any period in which they value
the prize highly, none of them will bid, thereby reducing their costs and
apparently ensuring that government will award the prize. Such collusion
may be unstable, because then if one ﬁrm did lobby while the other ﬁrm
did not, the lobbying ﬁrm would win the prize for sure. More sophisticated
collusion would have only one of the two ﬁrms lobby in each period. Indeed,
14such collusion might be self-enforcing: if one ﬁrm is expected to lobby in
a given period, the other ﬁrm has no incentive to lobby, because if it did,
government would retain the prize.
Such collusion could be eﬀective for a limited number of periods. But note
that if government recognizes that the ﬁrms collude, then it will recognize
that it learns nothing about the value of the prize. For some parameter
values, this means that government will not wish to award the prize at all.
6.4 More than two ﬁrms
When more than to ﬁrms can lobby, each perfectly informed about the com-
mon value of the prize, the government could, potentially, observe a wider
variety of lobbying activity. A natural candidate for an equilibrium has each
ﬁrm lobby with the same probability λi, with 0 < λL < λH < 1 when a ﬁrm
values the prize at Vi. This behavior by ﬁrms would be consistent with equi-
librium if each ﬁrm correctly believed that the government would withhold
the prize if and only if at least m + 1 ﬁrms lobbied, where πm < ¯ π < πm+1.
Here πi is the government’s posterior belief that the value is VH, given that
i ﬁrms lobbied. Since πi > πi−1, as long as λH > λL and π0 < ¯ π < πN (with
N the total number of ﬁrms) such a threshold cutoﬀ m will exist.
Of course the λi’s chosen by ﬁrms depend on their expectations about
the government’s threshold number m of ﬁrms which determines whether
government will award the prize. A higher threshold makes lobbying more
attractive. In turn, higher λi’s will lower the government’s threshold. So
there will typically be a unique threshold level m of lobbying which is con-
sistent with equilibrium.
But other equilibria with mixed strategies are possible. A simple possi-
bility has only two of the N ﬁrms lobby. If ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 each lobbies
with probability






when it believes the prize has value Vi, then each of the two ﬁrms will be
indiﬀerent between lobbying and not lobbying: the expected payoﬀ from
lobbying,
(1 − λi)Vi − F (23)





15In this case, none of the other N −2 ﬁrms will lobby. The expected proﬁt of
any ﬁrm other than ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm 2 when it lobbies is
(1 − λi)
2Vi − F; (25)





Since the second expression is (1−λi) times ﬁrm 1’s expected payoﬀ from not
lobbying, and the ﬁrst expression is less than (1−λi) times ﬁrm 1’s expected
payoﬀ from lobbying, ﬁrms 3,4,...,N would strictly prefer not to lobby.
So with N ﬁrms a Nash equilibrium exists with each of two ﬁrms lobbying
with probability λi deﬁned by equation (22), provided that this strategy
implies π1 < ¯ π < π2 when the government does its Bayesian updating. But
equation (22) is just equation (12), with the ﬁxed cost scaled up by N/(N−1)
instead of 2. Figure 1 shows that eﬀectively lowering the ﬁxed cost of lobbying
leads to the existence of a signaling equilibrium, if the government’s threshold
probability ¯ π is close to, but less than, its prior expectation π.
Of course, when the number of ﬁrms exceeds two, many other mixed-
strategy equilibria are possible, such as equilibria in which each of n < N
ﬁrms lobbies with some positive probability λi, and in which the other N −n
ﬁrms never lobby.
6.5 Examples of excessive lobbying
Finding examples where projects were cancelled because of excessive lobbying
is more diﬃcult than ﬁnding examples where projects were completed—the
cancelled ones do not exist, have no oﬃcials responsible for them, and are not
subject to continuing media coverage or political debate. It is like the dog in
the Sherlock Holmes story which did not bark. Yet some examples come to
mind. In 2001 NextWave, Verizon Wireless, and AT&T Wireless intensely
lobbied Congress, but it refused to approve an agreement that would have
paid NextWave to transfer spectrum rights to the other ﬁrms.3Our view is
that the heavy lobbying signaled that the agreement would excessively beneﬁt
the ﬁrms, thereby reducing congressional support for the agreement.
3See http://www.wirelessweek.com/index.asp?layout=article&articleid=CA 188950.
The NextWave example illustrates, incidentally, the grave problems that can arise with
auctions.
16A similar history may apply to the SuperConducting Super Collider.4
Initial estimates of the costs were $2 billion, including the construction of
an oval, underground tunnel some 54 miles in circumference. States lobbied
heavily to be selected as the site of the project, with many oﬀering large
ﬁnancial contributions. After a presidential decision in 1987 to proceed with
the project, 26 states submitted proposals, of which seven were selected for
further review, resulting in the selection of Texas as the site for the project.
But then support for the project declined, leading to its cancellation in 1993.
The standard story for the decline in support is that congressmen viewed
the project as a pork barrel, with states engaged in rent seeking to obtain
the project. Once it became clear that only Texas would get the project,
congressmen from other states, the story goes, withdrew their support. We
would add an additional element. The intensive eﬀorts by states to get the
project suggested to other congressmen (including those from states which
had not even submitted a proposal) that the beneﬁts of the project would
be largely local, so that states other than Texas might beneﬁt little. That is,
in our view support for the project declined because some states devoted so
much eﬀort to getting the project.
7 Conclusion
We considered several mechanisms which would allow government to learn
from ﬁrms their private information about the value of a prize, while not
requiring government to grant the prize when its value is high. The problem
diﬀers from that addressed in auctions—the conventional problem has a ﬁrm
which reveals that it highly values the asset as increasing the probability that
it will receive it; in the problem we address we would want the ﬁrm’s chances
of getting the asset to decline with its valuation of it.
We saw that some mechanisms can approach the eﬃcient allocation ar-
bitrarily closely. Perhaps the most interesting of these mechanisms is a rent-
seeking game. It can perfectly reveal the information, yet under some con-
ditions would require government to ineﬃciently grant the prize only with
very small probability.
We also showed how lobbying can generate informational beneﬁts. This
contrasts with the standard approach, which views lobbying as eﬀective in
getting ﬁrms what they want: newspapers often report following the failure
4See Jeﬀreys (1992).
17of a special interest that “despite intense lobbying” government adopted or
failed to adopt some policy. We show how the intense lobbying can cause the
special interest to fail.
We thus interpreted rent seeking, and more generally lobbying, in a novel
way. Rather than assume that government passively responds to political
pressures, we explain how rent seeking can beneﬁt government by providing
information about the value of the prize it allocates. Even when extensive
rent seeking causes government to refrain from awarding the prize, each ﬁrm
engages in rent seeking because it thereby increases the chance that it rather
than the competing ﬁrm will win whatever prize is awarded.
188 Notation
F Cost of lobbying
Gi Value of asset to government when its value to a ﬁrm is Vi
Vi Value of prize to ﬁrm, with i = H or i = L
z Probability government awards prize when it believes its value to ﬁrm is
VH.
λi Probability ﬁrm lobbies when value of prize is i
π Prior probability that value of prize is high
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